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FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
JOHN G. ROBERTS� 
AFSCME �. Washington: 
Comparable Worth Case 
I have reviewed Judge Tanner's opinion in AFSCME v. 
Washington, C82-465T (W.D. Wash 1983), the so-called "equal 
pay for work of comparable worth" case. The opinion granted 
back pay and injunctive relief under Title VII of the civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), to the 
class of state employees in jobs primarily (defined as 70% 
or more) held by women. The theory of the plaintiffs, 
accepted by the court, was not the traditional Title VII 
theory that women were being paid less than men doing the 
same or substantially the same work. The theory was not 
"equal·pay for equal work." Rather, plaintiffs argued and 
the court agreed that the state violated Title VII because 
workers in a class of jobs held primarily by women were paid 
less than workers in a class of jobs held primarly by men, 
even though the work in both classes of jobs was, according 
to sociological studies admitted as evidence, "worth" the 
same. 
For example, most truck drivers are male and most laundry 
workers female. The sociologists, using a four-category 
"point" system with points for knowledge and skills, mental 
demands, accountability, and working conditions, determined 
that driving a truck and working in the laundry are jobs of 
comparable worth. The predominantly male truck drivers make 
more than the predominantly female laundry workers, however, 
and, according to Judge Tanner, that is sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII. 
In his opinion Tanner recognized that the case was one of 
first impression. He sought, however, to derive significant 
support from the 1981 Supreme Court decision in County of 
Washington�. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). In that case a 
sharply divided Court ruled, 5-4, that female prison guards 
hired to guard female prisoners could sue under Title VII, 
alleging that they were discriminatorily paid less than male 
prison guards hired to guard male prisoners. Defendants had 
argued that no violation of Title VII could be established, 
since the female guards could not allege that they were paid 
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less than a man hired to do the same job -- i.e., a male 
guard hired to guard female prisoners (there was no such 
person). As noted, this argument was rejected by the 
narrowest of margins. 
Judge Tanner's huge leap from Gunther to a comparison of 
totally dissimilar jobs such as those of truck drivers and 
laundry workers has no basis in the language or logic of 
Gunther. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Gunther 
expressly noted that the claim in that case was "not based 
on the controversial concept of 'comparable worth,' under 
which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the 
basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty 
of their job with that of other jobs in the same 
organization or community." 452 U.S. , at 166. Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Stewart and Powell, pointed out the flaws in the 
Court's opinion, but concluded that "its narrow holding is 
perhaps its saving feature. The opinion does not endorse 
the so-called 'comparable worth' theory • . • •  " Id., at 203. 
It is difficult to exaggerate the perniciousness of the 
"comparable worth" theory. It mandates nothing less than 
central planning of the economy by judges. Under the theory 
judges, not the marketplace, decide how much a particular 
job is worth, and restructure wage systems to reflect their 
determination. The marketplace places a higher value on the 
work of truck drivers than on that of laundry workers, but 
Judge Tanner, under the guise of remedying gender 
discrimination, concluded that both jobs are "worth" the 
same and ordered that workers in both groups be paid the 
same. This is a total reorientation of the law of gender 
discrimination. Under the accepted view, if a qualified 
woman wanted to become a truck driver, and was denied the 
opportunity, or was given a job but paid less than a male 
truck driver, she could seek relief under Title VII. The 
comparable worth theory, by contrast, offers relief to any 
group of workers (either predominantly female or male) that 
can convince a judge that their jobs are intrinsically 
"worth" more than what they can command in the marketplace. 
What this theory means in terms of judicial planning of our 
economy is demonstrated by the frequent references in Judge 
Tanner's opinion to the 1976-19 7 7  Washington state budget 
surplus "that could have been used to pay Plaintiff's [sic] 
their evaluated worth." Slip op. , at 22; see also id., 
at 33. 
A good sense of the type of jurist with which we are dealing 
in this case is conveyed by the following quotation from the 
opinion: 
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Perhaps Defendant adopted the practices and concepts 
of sex discrimination against women in employment as 
just another manifestation of centuries old discrim­
inatory attitudes and practices of a male dominated 
society. The Declaration of Independence probably 
sheds some light on the practices and concepts of 
sex discrimination so rampant in this country. 
" . • .  That all men are created equal; That they are 
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable 
rights; That among these are Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness." The female gender is 
conspicuously absent in the Declaration of 
Independence. Slip op. , at 41. 
The decision is being appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the 
State of Washington. No briefing schedule has yet been set. 
The United States did not participate below; it can 
participate as amicus in the Ninth Circuit, wait until the 
almost inevitable petition for Supreme Court review of 
whatever the Ninth Circuit decides, or not participate at 
all. I am advised that the Civil Rights Division will send 
a recommendation to the Solicitor General in two-three 
weeks. I strongly suspect that recommendation will be that 
the Government participate on the side of the State before 
the Ninth Circuit. Whether this makes political sense, when 
there is the option of waiting until the case reaches the 
Supreme Court, will have to be addressed at some level above 
the Civil Rights Division. 
As you doubtless know, the issue of possible participation 
by the United States has already attracted considerable 
media attention. There is no need for action by our office 
at this time, but we should be alert that the transition at 
Justice does not result in this decision receiving anything 
less than the most careful consideration, not only at 
Justice but over here as well. 
